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American Democracy Promotion 
and the ‘Arab Spring’
Oz Hassan
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks the United States increasingly sought to promote democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, 
although this strategy came to be largely associated with the invasion of Iraq, and the 
belief that a benign domino effect would spread throughout the region, there was far more 
nuance to the policy President Obama inherited. President George W. Bush’s democracy 
promotion legacy is one of institutional construction within the US foreign policy bureaucracy, 
creating the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Middle East Free Trade Area 
(MEFTA), and the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative (BMENA). Furthermore, 
it was President Bush who codified his democracy promotion strategy in National Security 
Presidential Directive 58, entitled Institutionalising the Freedom Agenda, and who signed 
the ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2007 into law.1 By the time that President Bush left office 
hundreds of millions of dollars had been spent on promoting democracy in the MENA, 
and the US had declared with the force of law that it would prioritise, along with other 
foreign policy goals, the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world.
At a superficial level, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ appears to vindicate President Bush’s Freedom Agenda 
and suggests that President Obama should continue to follow the path laid out by his predecessor. 
However, upon closer inspection such an assertion is highly problematic. The 2011 revolutions, rather 
than vindicating the Freedom Agenda, are in fact the ultimate expression of its failure. The Freedom 
Agenda was designed to gradually reform the region over a period of generations working with ‘friends’ 
and ‘partners’. The objective was to incrementally transform the region in a stable manner compatible 
with the pursuit of American interests. These include the free flow of oil and gas, the movement of 
military and commercial traffic through the Suez Canal, infrastructure construction projects, the security 
of regional allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and cooperation on military, counter-terrorism, and 
counter-proliferation issues. The Arab Spring introduces uncertainty in the pursuit of these interests. It 
is not clear whether democratic consolidation will take place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and even if 
it does, it is not clear that democratisation is compatible with America’s other interests in the region. 
The early days of the ‘spring’ have foregrounded these issues, with Egyptian protesters storming the 
Israeli embassy in Cairo, Egypt allowing two Iranian warships to transit through the Suez Canal, a 
Shi’ite uprising in Bahrain generating fears that Iran could gain influence affecting neighbouring Saudi 
Arabia, alarm that Islamists could come to power throughout the region, and increased volatility in 
the price of oil. Such regional instability and uncertainty is hardly the hallmark of a successful policy. 
Yet, as the Obama administration attempts to navigate a policy through the changing Middle East 
mosaic, it is becoming highly evident that this policy has a remarkable continuity with its predecessors. 
1  This acronym stands for Advance Democratic Values, Address Nondemocratic Countries, and Enhance Democracy Act.
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DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND THE BUSH 
LEGACY: 
 
The formal declaration of the Freedom Agenda 
by the Bush administration came on 6 November 
2003. Addressing the twentieth anniversary 
of the National Endowment of Democracy 
(NED), the president announced that: 
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and 
accommodating the lack of freedom in the 
Middle East did nothing to make us safe – 
because in the long run, stability cannot be 
purchased at the expense of liberty. As long 
as the Middle East remains a place where 
freedom does not flourish, it will remain a 
place of stagnation, resentment, and violence 
ready for export. And with the spread of 
weapons that can bring catastrophic harm 
to our country and to our friends, it would 
be reckless to accept the status quo.
The ‘big idea’ being espoused was not simply that 
freedom and democracy should be promoted in the 
Middle East, but rather that it was in America’s national 
interest to undertake such a task. Tyrannical regimes, it 
was argued, were providing the conditions for terrorist 
organisations seeking weapons of mass destruction to 
recruit and flourish, which posed an existential threat 
to the US. Thus the administration was arguing that 
the internal character of states was of concern for 
American security, and that America’s wider regional 
interests had aligned with American national values. 
 
As the Freedom Agenda became institutionalised, the 
policy came to embody both radical and conservative 
strands. The radical dimension of this policy insisted on 
political democracy, through military regime change 
if necessary, and was targeted against those that 
opposed American power and influence in the region. 
Beyond Iraq, this was expressed in the Iran Democracy 
Program and the Syria Democracy Program, which 
sought to utilise MEPI funds and personnel to bolster 
internal dissidents and exile groups wanting US-
supported regime change. The conservative dimension 
of the policy, however, attempted to broaden the US 
approach to Middle East reform by focusing on factors 
outlined in the 2002 UN Arab Human Development 
Report. This had highlighted a ‘freedom deficit’ in the 
MENA and argued that a strategy needed to be in 
place to deliver ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from 
want’, in conjunction with educational improvements 
and women’s empowerment to the people in the 
region. As such, MEPI was constructed to address 
these issues within its democracy promotion strategy, 
and was strategically placed within the Department 
of State’s Bureau for Near East Affairs as the central 
hub for interagency discussions under the Freedom 
Agenda.
What made this programme particularly conservative, 
however, was its emphasis on safeguarding the socio-
economic privileges and power of the established 
autocratic allies in the region. The grand liberal strategy 
that the Bush administration espoused came with some 
strong caveats. Senior Bush administration official were 
quick to quell notions that a rift with long-term allies 
such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt had emerged after the 
launch of the MEPI, arguing that democracy promotion 
was to be done in ‘partnership’ and designed to offer 
‘positive reinforcement for emerging reform trends’. 
In part, this conservative dimension reflected how 
MEPI personnel were uncertain about how exactly to 
‘promote democracy’. Further still, it reflected MEPI 
personnel’s unfamiliarity with regional and internal 
politics. With most of the personnel being drawn 
from the ‘children’ of the NED, and having largely 
dealt with democracy promotion in Russia and Eastern 
Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, they relied 
on the Bureau for Near East Affairs for information. 
This information was however not often forthcoming, 
as there was considerable mid-level opposition from 
the Department of State, and also the Department 
of Defense, who highlighted the conflict of interests 
emerging between democracy promotion and other 
long term perceived national interests.
Balancing other interests with the strategic 
objective of promoting democracy presented the 
administration with a serious problem to navigate, and 
consequently key figures in the administration turned 
to the one-size fits all approach of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’. Democracy promotion came to mean 
calling for elections, opening markets following the 
prescriptions of neoliberal economics, and pushing 
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for free trade integration within larger interdependent 
markets; all in the hope of generating gradual and 
stable transformation into ‘market democracies’. 
Between 2004 and 2006, the Bush administration 
was particularly vocal about pushing for elections. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly 
confronted close allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia to 
hold fair elections, release political prisoners, and 
allow free expression and rights for women. This 
situation radically changed throughout 2006, when 
the Bush administration failed to foresee the electoral 
victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary 
elections. This was compounded by a pattern of 
Islamic groups, hostile to Washington and Israel, 
winning significant gains through elections, which 
included the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah 
in Lebanon, and Shi’ites backed by militias in Iraq. 
Under such conditions, the Bush administration 
speedily overturned what was already a thin dedication 
to pressuring autocratic regimes to hold elections. 
Where Condoleezza Rice had once pronounced the 
need to move towards democracy, by 2007 there 
was near silence on pressuring for domestic reform 
and the void was filled with appreciative comments 
about Egypt’s support in the region and Saudi Arabia’s 
‘moderate’ behaviour.
Consequently, the Freedom Agenda rapidly dropped 
its emphasis on elections, but retained a focus on open 
markets and free trade. Economic initiatives became 
the central pillar of the agenda, and what remained 
was an incoherent set of policies held together by a 
neoliberal core; economic reform was the order of the 
day and not directly challenging or necessitating serious 
political reform from partners and allies in the region. 
This was certainly a key feature of the MEPI funding 
programme under its ‘economic pillar’, but equally, 
under MEFTA. For US Trade Representative Robert B. 
Zoellick, MEFTA was perceived to be a key element of 
America’s ‘competitive liberalisation strategy’, which 
would make an assault on protectionism and lead 
to countries eager for greater access to US markets 
vying for Washington’s attention and approval. By the 
time President Bush left office, it was clear that the 
Freedom Agenda was pursuing an ‘economics-first’ 
strategy in which the administration was envisaging 
a gradual modernisation process giving rise to 
democratic peace. Alternatively, MENA regimes were 
hoping that a modernisation process would allow 
them to construct Beijing modelled liberal autocracies. 
Rather than challenging the political power of friendly 
regimes, the Bush administration was working 
with them, in ‘partnership’, to carefully and slowly 
liberalise their autocracies and create the conditions 
for potential future reform. The Freedom Agenda’s 
conservative strand was relying on gradual economic 
sequencing to produce democratisation. That is to 
say, the Freedom Agenda recognised the growing 
potential for legitimation crises in the region, but 
sought to steadily prevent their coming to fruition for 
the sake of regional stability, security, and an eventual 
long-term transition to democracy. Thus, rather than 
the “Arab Spring” vindicating the Freedom Agenda, 
events have demonstrated how the agenda was unable 
to stave off legitimation crises. What’s more, Bush’s 
strategy further exposed the region, and in particular 
Tunisia and Egypt, to the forces of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, exacerbating legitimation crises rather 
than preventing them. The conservative strand of the 
Freedom Agenda was designed to ‘slowly’ transform 
the region in ‘partnership’ with autocratic allies to 
precisely avoid the scenes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya 
and to avoid the level of strategic uncertainty that the 
post-Tahrir era represents. 
OBAMA’S SPRING TIME POLICY
Upon coming into office it was clear that the Obama 
administration wanted to distance themselves from 
the Freedom Agenda and its association with the 
Iraq war. As such, President Obama was eager to 
suggest that the radical side of the Freedom Agenda 
would be replaced with a more pragmatic ‘open 
handed’ approach. Moreover, many critics argued 
that the Obama administration seemed to abandon 
democracy promotion altogether because of its ‘toxic’ 
association with the President Bush. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton was willing to assert the need for a 
‘comprehensive plan’ for ‘diplomacy, development 
and defense’ in her Senate confirmation hearing, 
but ‘advancing democracy’ was only represented 
as a ‘hope’. Nonetheless, on closer inspection, the 
Obama administration had expanded the conservative 
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side of the Freedom Agenda through increased MEPI 
funding and appointing Tamara Coffman Wittes as 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. 
Indeed, appointments such as Anne-Marie Slaughter 
as Director of Policy Planning, Susan Rice as UN 
Ambassador, and Samantha Power and Michael 
McFaul to the National Security Council suggest that 
democracy promotion was far from being removed 
from the Obama agenda. Where there was an 
intellectual shift with their predecessors, it was most 
prominently demonstrated in the administration’s 
attempts to stress dignity and development as a means 
of countering Islamist organisations in the region, but 
also for enabling a stable modernisation process to take 
place. Thus, the language of ‘dignity and development’ 
replaced talk of ‘democracy promotion’, and the 
Obama administration initially attempted to replace 
‘market driven modernisation’ with ‘development 
driven modernisation’ to underpin a gradualist strategy. 
However, in the aftermath of the 2011 revolutions the 
Obama administration would increasingly come to see 
the Bush administration’s approach as the preferred 
policy agenda. 
On May 19, 2011, President Obama took centre stage 
in the Department of State’s Benjamin Franklin room, to 
announce an apparently ‘bold new approach to foreign 
policy’ and US relations with the MENA. He argued 
that the 2011 revolutions in the MENA were caused 
by a denial of dignity, a lack of political and economic 
self-determination throughout the region, the role of 
new media, and the region’s young demographic. He 
argued that Tunisia and Egypt were entering years of 
transition and that this process of transition will have 
ups and downs potentially challenging America’s core 
interests, but that the administration would continue 
to ‘keep our commitments to friends and partners’. 
Further echoing George W. Bush, President Obama 
argued that the status quo was not sustainable and 
that the US has a stake in the stability of nations and 
the self-determination of individuals in the region. As 
a result he reinforced the premises of Bush’s liberal 
grand strategy for the Middle East, arguing that the 
US should ‘not pursue the world as it is, but use this 
[the Arab Spring] as a chance to pursue the world 
as it should be’. In this context, the president began 
attempting to lay out his liberal grand strategy for 
the region under the headings of political reform, 
human rights, and economic reform. He argued that 
since the Arab Spring, the US has shown that it opposes 
the use of force to oppress the people of the region, 
supports universal rights, and political and economic 
reform. The supposed new strategy would be to 
help support reform across the region starting with 
the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions to democracy, 
and noted the serious problems in Libya, Syria, and 
Iran, whilst also condemning partners such as Yemen 
and Bahrain for their use of force (and by implication 
Saudi Arabia). The president, at considerable length, 
detailed how the US would support change in the 
region through economic development for nations 
that are transitioning to democracy, asserting that: 
America’s support for democracy will therefore 
be built on financial stability, promoting 
reform, and integrating competitive markets 
each other and the global economy…  
starting with Tunisia and Egypt. 
The president continued to argue that the problem 
with the region was its ‘closed economies’ and that the 
region needed ‘trade’ and ‘not just aid’; ‘investment’ 
and ‘not just assistance’; and that ‘protectionism 
must give way to openness’. Nonetheless, it was 
announced that:
•	 The World Bank and IMF were to construct a 
plan to present to the G8 Summit about what 
would be needed to stabilise and modernise 
the economies of Tunisia and Egypt.
•	 Egypt would be relieved of $1 billion in 
debt and allocated $1 billion in loans for 
infrastructure.
•	 The US would help to recover assets that 
had been stolen by  members of the former 
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt.
•	 Enterprise Funds would be set up to invest in 
Tunisia and Egypt – modelled on the funds 
that helped transitions in Eastern Europe.
•	 OPEC would create a $2 billion facility to help 
support private investment.
•	 The US would work with allies to refocus 
the European Bank for reconstruction and 
development so it provides the same support 
for democratic transitions and economic 
modernisation in the MENA as it has in 
Europe.
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This is a very different understanding of the problems 
presented by the Arab Spring and their solution to those 
being constructed by the protesters of Tahrir Square. 
It was not a definition of freedom underpinned by 
economics that they were willing to die for, but human 
rights, social justice, and in some quarters adherence 
to the Islamic faith. For the US to create enough space 
for policy innovation, the Obama administration needs 
to understand how the concept of freedom is being 
constructed in Egypt, in large part, around the concept 
of ‘citizenship’; instead of prescribing a definition of 
freedom in discord to the aspirations of Egyptians. 
The Obama administration should not attempt to 
substitute an economic understanding of freedom 
born out of the philosophies of Hayek and Friedman, 
but should instead seek to understand indigenous calls 
for ‘rights’, ‘liberation’, ‘solidarity’.From the multitude 
of signs to the pamphlets being handed out in and 
around Tahrir Square, it is clear that a multitude of 
Egyptian definitions of freedom are emerging. All 
want to move away from the tyranny of the Mubarak 
regime, and some are more politically liberal and 
secular than others.Yet, the Obama administration 
would be better ‘supporting’ these positive trends, 
rather than ‘promoting’ an approach derived from 
the distant shores of Washington D.C. Indeed, it 
would appear that rather than the ‘Arab Spring’ and 
the ramifications of the global financial crisis giving 
cause for America’s democracy bureaucracy to take 
pause for thought, they instinctively have drawn 
on their training in Eastern Europe to propose the 
‘cookie cutter’ approach of the Washington 
Consensus. The ‘new’ policy is held together by a 
desire to hold onto the gradualist paradigm where 
possible, but where unavailable, ensure that the 
opportunity of a crisis is not missed and free trade 
and free market approach is adopted as the core of 
America’s democracy promotion strategy. 
With such poor policy innovation, it would appear 
that the Obama administration is replicating the same 
mistakes, failures, and missed opportunities of the 
Bush administration.
CONCLUSION
Given the profound nature of the Arab Spring, which 
is radically transforming the region, it is problematic 
that there has not been a correspondingly profound 
shift in America’s democracy promotion policy. This 
has not been because the US is pursuing sound policy 
programmes, but rather that there is a lack of policy 
innovation within the Obama administration. The US 
has lost the grand strategy ‘gradualism’ provided, 
and has little by way of an alternative strategy in 
response. US policy in the Middle East is in need of a 
new policy paradigm to replace that which has failed, 
but this is not easy because democratic openings in 
the region exacerbate a conflict of interest at the heart 
of US engagement with the region. Gradualism was 
characterised by a lack of clear policy delineation, 
between policies that sought to push regimes towards 
democratisation, and those that sought greater 
cooperation with them on economic and security 
issues. If democracy is perceived as a gradual but 
inevitable economically produced outcome, then why 
would mid-level officials feel the need to push for it 
over more immediate interests and security concerns? 
Pushing for a policy that is going to make cooperation 
with the ‘partner’ country you are posted to more 
difficult is somewhat anathema to a comfortable 
diplomatic positing. This has only been exacerbated 
by the rise of new global powers willing to build closer 
cooperative partnerships in order to meet their energy 
needs, irrespective of whether MENA regimes violate 
human rights on a systematic basis. 
Nonetheless, rather than defining ‘freedom’ for the 
region in neoliberal economic terms, the US needs 
to understand how to better engage and support 
those protesting on the streets. It needs to listen to 
voices in Tahrir square that when questioned about 
American policies oppose the oppression caused 
by US support for Mubarak, but continue to hold 
America as an exemplar. Among the signs visible from 
walking around Tahrir during its protestor occupation, 
•	 Establish a comprehensive trade and 
investment initiative with the MENA; 
working with the EU to facilitate more trade 
from within the region, and build on existing 
agreements to provide integration with the 
US and EU markets.
•	 Help these transition countries ‘tear down 
the walls’ that stand in the way of progress 
and help them fulfil their ‘international 
obligations’.
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there were constant calls for ‘freedom’; and when you talk to the organisers of movements instrumental to 
the overthrow of Mubarak, they tell you how they studied the history of non-violent movements and cite 
amongst others Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, and Malcolm X. When you hear Egyptians citing King’s ‘I have 
a dream’ speech yards from Tahrir Square’s Kentucky Fried Chicken, which was turned into a makeshift clinic for 
the injured and sick, it is clear the influence the US has in the region and the power of the US to continue to 
inspire the fight for greater freedom from tyranny. This is not the language of global capital, but of a definition 
of freedom that is based around indigenous understandings of citizenship, rights and social justice, and 
articulated in a narrative that draws upon the American story in an effort to write a new Egyptian story.America 
needs to understand Egyptian’s vision of the future and support it; not seek to define and impose a way of 
life upon others. ■
